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Sent via PDB Briefer,
28 June 1983.

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

27 June 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Summitry

As I told you on Sunday, after my quick reading, I like your memorandum on summitry. Reading it carefully again, I have two reservations and one suggestion. The reservations are in the paragraph on the critical issue of Third Areas on page 3. They are these:

1. The Soviets have little or no interest in drawing us into a form of geopolitical "horse-trading based on an implicit recognition of spheres of influence." They have their spheres of influence nailed down, they are presently targetting and expanding in other areas which we have shown little capacity to defend. For example, why would they give up the prospect in Central America in return for a free hand in Poland, which to all intents and purposes they already have.

2. We hardly have to make it clear that "irresponsible Soviet behavior is a major impediment to the whole range of U.S.-Soviet relations." They have been told that by at least five Presidents and in each case they have demonstrated that they were not willing to give up their efforts to expand their influence in the Third World in return for improved U.S.-Soviet relations.

Now for my suggestion. I agree that we don't want a summit without adequate preparation. I further believe that there is no way the Soviets would do a summit meeting in mid-1984 because they will do nothing to help President Reagan be reelected. But what they might find to be in their interest is a non-substantive meeting in New York at the UN. This would have to be informal with no White House hype to build up expectations, no intent to arrive at agreements, but merely an opportunity to get acquainted and talk about the agenda before the two countries. This would be sufficiently before the crunch period on deployment. It might serve Andropov's domestic purposes. The President would be showing flexibility and willingness to talk to the American public as well as the Europeans. If the Soviets were to decline the meeting that word would get out both at home and in Europe which would help the President. It could be an afternoon's talk followed by a small dinner or a small dinner followed by an evening's talk, perhaps with the Director General of the UN as host to minimize protocol problems.

William J. Casey

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